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要 旨
 戦後のアメリカの対日占領政策の究極目的は，日本を二度と国際の平和と安定を脅かす存在にしない
ことであった．この目的を達成するために，日本を再編する懲罰的措置が採用され，対日占領の初期段
階で，実施されていた．だが，1948年初頭になると，懲罰的措置は，日本の経済復興に資するような，
より穏和なものにとって替えられた．多くの歴史学者は，こうした対日占領政策の変化を，米ソ間のイ
デオロギー対立と迫り来る冷戦状況の結果だと評価している．すなわち，アメリカの対日占領政策は，
トルーマンドクトリンやマーシャルプランに代表されるような，アメリカのグローバルな対ソ封じ込め
政策の一環と捉えられ，変容されたのだ．
 ここで，冷戦の影響のみが，対日占領政策の唯一の要因であるかという疑問が生ずる．本稿では，対
日占領政策の他の要因として，次の二点，つまり，（1）日本の経済窮状，（2）対日占領政策に批判的な
アメリカの圧力団体を指摘する．本稿では，この二つの要因が，賠償問題と財閥解体政策に与えた影響
を検証する．本稿は，上記の二つの要因が占領期日本の経済復興政策の推進力となり，そして冷戦状況
の激化により日本の経済復興政策が強化されていく過程を明らかにするものである．
大学院研究年報　第46号　2017年 2 月
　Contents
Ⅰ Introduction
Ⅱ Economic Planning for Occupied Japan, 1943-1947
Ⅲ  The Criticism of the SCAP Economic Policies under the Looming Cold War
Ⅳ Entrenchment of Economic Recovery, 1948–1949
Ⅴ Conclusion
＊ オクタイ　クルトゥルシュ　　法学研究科政治学専攻博士課程前期課程
2016年10月 7 日　推薦査読審査終了
第 1 推薦査読者　滝田　賢治
第 2 推薦査読者　星野　　智
492
I Introduction
 Post-surrender policies for Japan, their establishment, and the reasons behind the policy changes are all 
well-known subjects that were analyzed by many researchers. Regarding these, much scholarly work was 
published in the 1980s after many primary sources were made open to the public. During this period, the 
Revisionist historians left their mark upon the literature. They drew attention to the phenomenon of 
“reverse course,” a unilateral and politically reactionary “shift of emphasis” from reform policies to eco-
nomic recovery.1）
 What Revisionist historians did was link the changes in the occupation policies with the U.S. strategic 
interest and foreign policy. They explained that policy changes were made under the looming Cold War to 
protect U.S. national security. According to the revisionists, Washington shifted its emphasis from democ-
ratization and demilitarization policies to economic recovery and establishment of limited defense forces in 
Japan after: (1) the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan deepened the ideological rift between U.S. and 
the Soviet Union, (2) the consecutive communist gains against Kuomintang (KMT) in the Chinese Civil 
war pushed the U.S. to reconsider its choices of allies, and (3) the possibility of a spill-over of the commu-
nist inﬂuence in the South East Asia and the Far East increased concerns in Washington. As a result, the 
economic democratization policies, such as the deconcentration of excessive economic power and the repa-
ration policies that crippled the economic recovery and “self-sufﬁciency” of Japan, were shelved. Instead, a 
new set of policies to stabilize the Japanese economy and revitalize the trade relations between Japan and 
South East Asian countries were put into motion. To achieve the new goals, Washington sent Dodge 
Mission to implement austerity measures to curb spiraling inﬂation in Japan and establish a single 
exchange rate to revitalize its trade. According to revisionist historians, all these steps were taken in order 
to create a strong ally in the Far East which could prevent the spread of communist inﬂuence in the 
region.
 This interpretation which focuses on the macro level explanations of U.S national security is persuasive 
and plausible. It goes without saying that the Cold War dynamics played the role of a catalyst in the 
change of occupation policies to protect the core interests of the United States. Having said that, the Cold 
War dynamics were not the only factor affecting the occupation policies. I claim there are two more factors 
that explain why the policy reversal occurred: (1) Economic distress in Japan raised concerns over the 
feasibility of the democratization of Japan, and (2) the American pressure groups and Congress criticized 
the occupation policies which beaconed an intervention by Washington.
 In this paper, I argue that these two factors created the impetus of economic recovery, causing a reversal 
of occupation policies. As early as 1946, policy-makers in Washington and GHQ started recommending an 
economic recovery program for Japan to prevent civil unrest and to strengthen democratic tendencies. 
They mentioned that radical right or radical left could emerge and destroy all the achievements of the 
occupation unless the problems underlining the civil unrest were solved. They stressed that the Japanese 
economy should be brought to the self-sufﬁciency levels to assure that the democratization program would 
succeed, and Japan would not become a menace to the world order again. Meanwhile, American business-
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men and pressure groups criticized punitive economy program of the Occupation. American businessmen 
saw Japan as a great market for their businesses. But the Japanese economy was not performing well 
because of the stern reform policies, such as the purge of the business leaders, and deconcentration of 
excessive economic power. Uncertainties over reparations and dissolution of Japanese companies in which 
American businesses had great shares and interests furthered these concerns. Therefore, American pres-
sure groups started criticizing the ongoing reform program and recommended changes in the policies to 
create a suitable environment for conducting business in Japan.
 As the result of these factors, the economic recovery program gained utmost importance in late 1947. 
William Draper of the Army Department and George Kennan of the State Department went to Japan to 
stimulate a reversal of occupation policies. They conﬁrmed the need for economic recovery and drew 
attention to make Japan a strong ally in the Far East under the conditions of looming Cold War. In other 
words, the intensiﬁcation of the Cold War did not bring forward the idea of economic recovery, rather it 
fortiﬁed the already existent arguments of the policy-makers and the American businessmen who desired 
the economic recovery.
 However, this doesn’t mean that the Cold War did not play a role in the policy reversal. Moreover, by no 
means, this paper rejects or criticizes the revisionist interpretation. The main premise here is that revision-
ist interpretation could be buttressed by analyzing the economic distress in Japan and the inﬂuence of the 
American pressure groups. We believe that a detailed examination of the developments in 1946 and 1947 
would enable us to grasp how the arguments for economic recovery surfaced and then gained utmost 
importance by late 1947. For these reasons, following questions will be answered as clearly as possible in 
this paper: How did the punitive measures for occupation occur? To what extent, the economic distress in 
Japan affected the policy formulation in Washington? Were there any pressures to Washington by 
American pressure groups/businessmen to revive Japanese economy? If so, did they utilize the threat of 
communism in Japan to justify their purposes? Did American ex-businessmen/ bureaucrats play a role in 
reversing the course?
 The paper is going to examine the developments and changes in the policies of the Japanese occupation 
from December 1943 to December 1949. This timeframe will be divided into three parts. In the ﬁrst part, 
a historical background of economic policy formulation within the State Department between 1943 and 
1945 will be touched upon to enhance our understanding. Next, punitive measures for the zaibatsu and 
strict reparations policies will be examined. An effort will be made to understand how the directives from 
Washington were utilized by the GHQ personnel, particularly by “New Dealers,” to draw comprehensive 
dissolution policies for zaibatsu. In the second part, I will look into the concerns raised by “Japan Lobby” 
and American businessmen over the SCAP economy policies under the framework of economic distress, 
spiraling inﬂation, and escalating Cold War. The role of the members of “Japan Lobby,” such as James Lee 
Kauffman and Harry Kern in challenging the Occupation programs will be analyzed. In the third part, I 
will mainly explore two critical missions –Draper/Johnston and Kennan mission– sent by Washington to 
Japan in early 1948, and try to explain how they helped the entrenchment of economic recovery. In the last 
part, I will present the ﬁndings of this paper and draw up conclusions.
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II Economic Planning for Occupied Japan, 1943-1947
 Japan’s perilous walk into a war which started when she closed her eyes and “jumped from the veranda 
of the Kiyomizu Temple,” came to an end when Emperor Hirohito announced the surrender of Japan on 
August 15, 1945. Following the Hirohito’s radio broadcast, Instrument of Surrender was signed on U.S.S 
Missouri on September 2 and the occupation of Japan started. The main objective of the U.S. occupation of 
Japan was never to let Japan become a menace to the world peace and order ever again. To achieve this 
security-oriented objective, the U.S. decision makers thought that reforming the political, economic, and 
social structures of Japan was necessary.
A. The Framework for Policy Formulation
 The policy formulation for the post-surrender period started long before the termination of hostilities. 
Shortly after the United States became embroiled in Paciﬁc War in December 1945, Roosevelt directed the 
State Department to carry out the necessary proceedings required for the creation of post-war order. By 
starting the policy formulation early, Roosevelt administration tried not to repeat the ill-preparedness of the 
Wilson administration after the WWI.2） Accordingly, a proposal of a work schedule was released on 
December 1, 1942, by Far East Section of Special Research Division. Thereupon, many reports on a wide 
range of topics, such as the status of the Japanese Emperor, territorial limitations of the Empire, political 
structure of the Japan, were prepared by the State Department.3）
 The policy formulation process was carried out by a set of labyrinth-like organizations. First, the State 
Department took the initiative and created Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy (ACPFP) in 
the wake of the Pearl Harbor attack. ACPFP had ﬁve committees, dealing with economic, territorial, politi-
cal, international organization, and security matters. The formulation of postwar policies for Japan started 
in those committees. In the meantime, George H. Blakeslee, Hugh Borton, Robert A. Fearey, and Joseph 
W. Ballantine of the State Department played crucial roles in this process. Secondly, in summer 1943, the 
State Department created Country and Area Committees (CAC) to formulate speciﬁc policies for speciﬁc 
countries and regions. In October, Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East (FEAC) headed by 
George Blakeslee was established under the CAC to coordinate the policies among various committees 
within the State Department. Thirdly, Committee on Postwar Programs (PWC) was created in January 
1944 which replaced the ACPFP and its roles. Recently created Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far 
East (FEAC) then became a subcommittee of the Committee on Postwar Programs (PWC). PWC and the 
FEAC, therefore, became the central committees that formulated the prototype plans for the occupation 
policies.
 Meanwhile, Department of Navy created Occupied Area Section (OAS) in January 1943. Department of 
War followed this move by establishing Civil Affairs Division (CAS) in March 1943. Both committees were 
in charge of making preparations for the postwar policies. However, this situation complicated the policy 
formulation process. Every major department had their own committees, working on the postwar policies 
for Japan. A heap of uncoordinated policies by State, War, and Navy Departments ensued as a result. To 
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overcome this problem, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was created in December 1944 
to coordinate the views of three Departments on matters particularly those involving the foreign policy and 
relations with foreign nations. SWNCC held its ﬁrst meeting on December 19, 1944, and “the State-War-
Navy Coordination Subcommittee for the Far East” (SFE) was established on February 16, 1945.4） 
Subcommittee for the Far East (SFE) created the most important documents, namely “Basic Directive” 
(SWNCC 52/7), and “Initial Post-Defeat Policy Relating to Japan” (SWNCC 150/4/A) for the occupation of 
Japan.5）
 Going back to 1943, the formulation of the policies for the post-war Japanese economy started around 
June, under the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy (ACPFP). The early discussions under-
lined the differences among the three distinct schools of thought which deliberated over to what extent 
Japanese economy should be reformed. The ﬁrst group argued that the Japanese foreign policy which 
leads to aggression is fueled by her industrialization. Therefore, they recommended that all modern indus-
tries of Japan should be stripped from her, and U.S. should enforce a reversion of Japanese economy to a 
dominantly agricultural one. Close to this point of view, the second group proposed the liquidation of all of 
Japan’s heavy industries, or their transfer to China, followed by the surrender of the Japanese merchant 
marine. This idea forced Japan to be cut from international trade, and to have an economy based on 
domestic markets. Disagreeing with those ideas, the third group proposed preserving the essential indus-
tries of Japan to give her the opportunity to revive its economy. They argued that the liquidation of ship-
building and aircraft manufacturing industries that were used for war-making potential was enough to 
prevent Japan from becoming a menace to world order.6）
 The primary sources do not speciﬁcally mention the members of these groups. But, we can argue that 
ﬁrst and second schools of thoughts were dominated by “the China Crowd” or their supporters who 
wished a “weak Japan” to nurture a “strong China” in the Far East. The China Crowd supported the trans-
fer of production capabilities from Japan to China to tip the balance of power in favor of China. They 
rooted for stern occupation policies and reforms for Japan to prevent future aggression. The China Crowd 
wished for a “hard-peace” and recommended punitive measures to be implemented during the occupation. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to say that the China Crowd inﬂuenced the ﬁrst two groups’ way of thinking.
 On the other hand, the third group was dominated by “the Japan Crowd,” who recommended moderate 
policies for the Occupation. They believed that a weak Japan would represent a “malignant cancer in the 
body of the economic life of the Far East.” Robert A. Fearey7） one of the members of the Japan Crowd, 
argued that it would not only cause one-quarter of the Japanese population to starve to death but also 
would cripple the Japanese economy permanently if the plans of the China crowd were to be implemented. 
Dismantling all of Japan’s industries meant that Japan would be cut off from foreign trade, depriving Japan 
the “opportunity to restore her economy and achieve at least a tolerable standard of living.” In the light of 
these, Fearey favored the moderate plan of the third school. He rejected the plans that would make many 
Japanese people suffer greatly and underlined that “lasting peace in the Paciﬁc could be achieved only if 
Japan were economically healthy. Further, Fearey argued that “a healthy Japanese economy would offer 
important opportunities for American business.”8） (Emphasis added.)
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 Fearey’s recommendations inﬂuenced the discussions. In a report in September 29, 1943, titled “General 
Principles Applicable to the Postwar Settlement with Japan,” Blakeslee underlined that “economic and 
ﬁnancial conditions in the post-war period, so far as they may be controlled by the United Nations, should 
ultimately permit Japan, within the framework of the restrictions necessary for international security, to 
share in the development of a world economy on a non-discriminatory basis, looking toward a progressively 
higher standard of living.”9） (Emphasis added.) In other words, moderate economy policies for Japan found 
more support within the State Department.
 Another focal point for the discussions was the topic of the monopoly control in Japanese industry, com-
merce, and ﬁnance structure. Curiously, there was a near consensus that reforming the Japanese economy 
was needed to prevent the future aggression. The near-consensus stemmed from the opinion that zaibatsu 
(money-clique) and the gunbatsu (military-clique) cooperated and encouraged Japan’s war of aggression. 
Both groups gained immense proﬁts by invading Far Eastern and South East Asian countries and exploit-
ing their natural resources. Thus, zaibatsu leaders and ﬁrms were considered as warmongers which fueled 
the aggression over neighbors of Japan. On top of that, policymakers in Department of State thought that 
removal of the zaibatsu from the Japanese industrial scene “would in no way decrease the efﬁciency of 
production in Japanese industry,” and more importantly, would pave the way for strengthening the small 
and medium scale businesses, as well as the labor sector.10） In short, the existence of zaibatsu predomi-
nance was perceived as nothing but a danger to U.S. interests in the Far East. Removing them from 
Japanese economy was considered to be a basis for democratization policies.
 Parallel to the monopoly controls, there was a major agreement that substantial reparation should be 
required of Japan. Reparations were just, because, it was Japan who started the aggression against her 
neighbors and inﬂicted great damage to them. Japanese actions justiﬁed the reparations which were 
thought necessary to heal the wounds of ravaged counties. That’s being said, the Japan Crowd considered 
that reparation policies should not interfere with long-term objectives of U.S. policy.11） It was stressed that 
Japan does not have the economic capacity to pay the maximum amount of reparation that was demanded 
by the countries she waged war against. In addition, it is thought that economic burdens of the reparations 
might cause a failure in Japanese economy which directly inﬂuences other reformation plans devised by 
the U.S. To prevent such failure, the Japan Crowd argued that reparation policies must be given secondary 
importance and the punitive conceptions should be avoided.12） However, no comprehensive estimates to 
decide the amount of reparations could be done during the early planning stage. Therefore, the Secretary’
s Staff Committee decided that detailed studies would be done once Japan surrendered.13）
 In conclusion, the early reports prepared by the State Department stressed the prerequisite that Japan 
must be prevented from being a menace to the United States and the other countries of the Paciﬁc area.14） 
However, these reports did not envision stern and punitive measures for Japan. Rather, they recommended 
moderate policies to ensure that Japan could recover and become rehabilitated after democratization and 
demilitarization reforms achieved success. This situation did not change much up until April 1945 because 
the Subcommittee for the Far East (SFE), main policy formulation committee, was chaired by Eugene 
Dooman, and joined by George Blakeslee, Joseph Grew (Under Secretary of State), and Joseph Ballantine 
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(Director of Far Eastern Affairs). All were the members of “the Japan Crowd” who were sympathetic for a 
“soft-peace” for Japan, thus favored moderate occupation policies.
 When Roosevelt died and Harry Truman became the president in April 1945, the inﬂuence of the Japan 
Crowd started to fade. The replacement of the Secretary of State Stettinius with James Byrnes heralded 
the start of stern policies for Japan. Joseph Grew, undersecretary of the State Department resigned on 
August 15, and replaced by his “arch-adversary” Dean Acheson. Eugene Dooman, chairman of the 
Subcommittee for the Far East, was replaced by China specialist John Carter Vincent, who also took the 
Far Eastern Affairs Division of the State Department from the Japan Crowd member Joseph Ballantine. 
Another China specialist George Atcheson was dispatched to Tokyo as the Political Advisor (POLAD) for 
the Gen. MacArthur.15） Meanwhile, individuals such as Owen Lattimore and Andrew Roth who were the 
supporters of a “hard-peace,” started inﬂuencing the top decision-makers after many of the Japan Crowd 
were replaced by China specialists.16） Hatred towards the Japanese aggression was strong enough to justify 
punitive measures put forward by the China Crowd. Therefore, the supporters of the punitive measures 
against Japan started to affect the direction of the occupation policies after August 1945.
B. Post-Surrender Plans for the Occupation
 When the occupation started, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces (SCAP) Gen. Douglas 
MacArthur had two guidelines to follow: “Potsdam Declaration” and the summary of “Initial Post-Defeat 
Policy Relating to Japan” (SWNCC 150/4/A). The former emphasized that militaristic tendencies which 
deceived and misled the Japanese people into embarking on a world conquest should be eliminated, war 
criminals should be punished, and all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies 
should be removed. In addition, the declaration mentioned “Japan shall be permitted to maintain such 
industries as will sustain her economy, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this 
end, access to raw materials shall be permitted.”17） In other words, Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, 
gave an opportunity for Japanese people to build its peace-time industry and allowed them to import the 
necessary raw materials for industrial production. In this sense, the international document emphasized 
stern justice for militarists and ultra-nationalists but favored a moderate peace and productive lives for the 
Japanese people.
 The latter document, “Initial Policy,” was prepared by the State Department and sent to SCAP on August 
29. The document branched out the objectives mentioned in the Potsdam Declaration and laid out the ulti-
mate objectives – democratization and demilitarization – of the occupation. Initial Policy, since its inception, 
had similar objectives as the Potsdam Declaration but it was a more detailed document. It touched upon 
various matters such as the authority of the SCAP, political demilitarization, war criminals, freedom of 
speech, freedom of religious worship, and so on. Part IV of Initial Policy banned all factories that were 
related to war-making power and limited the size and character of Japan’s heavy industries to meet its 
future peaceful requirements.18） Furthermore, it recommended MacArthur to favor the programs that would 
ensure the democratic development of organizations in labor, industry, and agriculture. To fulﬁll this goal, 
a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which had exercised control 
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of a great part of Japan’s trade and industry was favored.19） Lastly, a reparation policy, through the transfer 
of Japanese property located outside of the Japanese mainland, and through the transfer of tools, equip-
ment, and facilities that were not necessary for the Japanese economy, was encouraged.20） The Initial Policy 
was later approved with minor changes by Far Eastern Commission and became the ofﬁcial “Basic Post-
Surrender Policy for Japan.”
 These two documents shaped two of the three pillars of the occupation policies that were built upon. They 
both encouraged the democratization and demilitarization of Japan and implicitly suggested a moderate 
peace. Both documents permitted Japan to keep her peacetime industries and gave Japanese an opportu-
nity to recover her economy as Fearey wished for. However, the United States assumed no responsibility 
for the economic recovery of the Japan. Initial Policy entrusted the responsibility for economic recovery to 
the Japanese government.
 During the ﬁrst weeks of the occupation, no reform measures were carried out by SCAP. This situation 
caused some assumptions of the so-called “soft policy” to appear in the press. However, on September 14, 
1945, MacArthur rejected the assumption of soft-policy and explained that “the surrender terms are not 
soft and they will not be applied in kid gloved fashion.”21） SCAP explicitly said that “when the ﬁrst phase 
[demobilization] is completed the other phases as provided in the surrender terms will infallibly follow.”22） 
Yet, the two documents were very general in nature and did not offer concrete measures on how to prog-
ress the reforms. To provide such measures, the last pillar of the occupation policies – “Basic Directive for 
Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper” known as Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1380/15 or 
“Basic Directive”– was sent to MacArthur on November 3, 1945.23）
 JCS 1380/15 had a different tone than the previous two documents. First of all, it contained more severe 
and punitive provisions. In this sense, it was similar to the famous JCS 1067, the governing statement of 
policy for the occupation of Germany that reﬂected the drastic Morgenthau concept of severely limiting the 
level of the losing country’s industrial production.24） To sum up, it underlined two stern principles related 
to the operation of Japanese economic system:
(1) SCAP would assume no obligations to maintain, or have maintained, any particular standard of 
living in Japan.
(2) SCAP will direct the Japanese authorities to make every feasible effort to avoid serious inﬂation. 
However, prevention or restraint of inﬂation shall not constitute a reason for limiting the removal, 
destruction, or curtailment of facilities in fulﬁllment of programs for reparations, restitution, demilitar-
ization, or economic disarmament.25） (Emphasis added)
In other words, MacArthur was given the authority by JCS 1380/15 to reform the economic, social, and 
political structures of Japan without assuming any responsibility for Japanese economic recovery. The 
demilitarization and democratization programs were favored even in the times of distress with only one 
exception: If the strikes or other work stoppages interfere with military operations or directly endanger the 
security of the occupying forces.26）
 Secondly, JCS 1380/15 was a more detailed directive, being three times longer than the Initial Policy. It 
recommended plans for dissolving large Japanese industrial and banking combines or other large concen-
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trations of private business control. Moreover, different from the previous documents, JCS 1380/15 pro-
vided the details needed for implementing the democratization of Japanese economic institutions. It recom-
mended MacArthur to direct the Japanese government to establish a public agency responsible for reorga-
nizing Japanese business in accordance with the military and economic objectives of your government.27）
 Lastly, JCS 1380/15, contrary to the Potsdam Declaration and Initial Policy, was not made public. It 
remained undercover until the latter phase of the occupation. This “how-to” guide for translating the prin-
ciples into action, was regarded as the “bible of the occupation.”28） The GHQ personnel, especially the “New 
Dealers29）,” treated it as the main framework for the occupation reforms and formulated policies based on 
this directive. Thus, in time the support for moderate plans for the occupation weakened and punitive mea-
sures to reform Japan gained utmost importance in the eyes of the occupiers.
C. The China Crowd and Inﬂuence of the New Dealers
 Shortly after JCS 1380/15 directive, President Truman appointed Edwin Pauley as his advisor on repara-
tions. Pauley, an independent California oil baron, yearned for punitive and retributive policies for Germany 
and Japan, as well as preventing their hasty revival.30） In November, Pauley went to Japan with his aides, 
including a longtime member of the China Crowd Owen Lattimore, and recommended removing surplus 
Japanese plants as war reparations for other Asian nations. They argued that Japan should not be allowed 
to maintain a higher living standard than her war victims.31） Pauley recommended that Japan will not be left 
with any plant which represents a key phase in the processing of the raw materials of any of her neigh-
bors. The heavy industries, such as steel, should be limited greatly, and the excess production capabilities 
should be transferred to her neighbors to stimulate economic growth there. To sum up, Pauley underlined 
that “reparations is a problem of contributing to the economic stabilization and to the political stabilization 
of East Asia as a whole.” He told, “in a rehabilitated Asia there will be a place for Japan, though no longer 
a place of leadership or control.”32） Accordingly, the interim Pauley report of December 6, 1945, recom-
mended transferal of a huge chunk of Japanese industry machinery to achieve those goals.33）
 Around the same time, staff sections34） were created within the GHQ to formulate speciﬁc policies that 
were necessary for the occupation. On September 15, 1945, the Economic and Scientiﬁc Section (ESS) was 
established to control Japan’s economic affairs and formulate policies on zaibatsu dissolution, labor reform, 
and reparations (until May 1947 when a separate Reparations Section was formed).35） Raymond C. Kramer 
became the chief of the ESS on October 2. Yet, the policy formulation did not start immediately. The ESS 
was understaffed and the necessary subsections, such as Antitrust and Cartels Division which handled the 
zaibatsu dissolution, was not established until January 1946. Even by then, Antitrust and Cartels Division 
had only 2-3 staff to analyze tremendous amounts of data.36）
 Lacking the necessary workforce and specialists, the ESS chief Kramer advised Japanese companies to 
submit voluntary dissolution plans to get dissolution reform going.37） On November 6, 1945, one of the big 
four zaibatsu, Yasuda Hozensha, proposed a voluntary reorganization plan after being advised by Watanabe 
Takeshi, a Finance Ministry ofﬁcer.38） Yasuda Plan proposed to dissolve the top-holding companies at the 
apex of the zaibatsu organization. MacArthur, being not sure of the program, telegrammed the Washington 
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for approval. After Washington’s approval, Yasuda Plan became the ﬁrst step in the dissolution program39）. 
Thus, on November 6, the ESS sent SCAP Instruction No. 244 (SCAPIN 244) to the Japanese government 
and called for the creation of a Holding Company Liquidation Commission to dissolve the top holding com-
panies and the zaibatsu-controlled ﬁrms.40） Washington also proposed to send an expert team to prepare 
comprehensive guides for the dissolution program.41） With the State Department’s permission and 
MacArthur’s afﬁrmative response, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy and Assistant Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs Will Clayton sent Corwin Edwards to Japan to further examine the economic 
democratization program.
 The Edwards Mission, ofﬁcially “The Mission on Japanese Combines,” remained in Japan from January 
6 to March 15, 1946. The State-War joint mission perceived zaibatsu as “a type of industrial organization 
that tends to hold down wages, block the development of labor unions, and destroy the basis for demo-
cratic independence in politics.” Thus, the mission argued zaibatsu prevented the rise of interests which 
could be used as counterweights to the militaristic ambitions of small groups.42）
 On March, the mission forwarded a report to Departments of State and War. To eradicate the inﬂuence 
of zaibatsu in Japanese economy, the report interpreted the term zaibatsu as widely as possible: “Any 
private enterprise conducted for proﬁt, or combination of such enterprises, which … restricts competition 
or impairs the opportunity for others to engage in business independently, in any important segment of 
business; and any individual, family, allied group, or juridical person owning or controlling such an enter-
prise or combination.”43） In brief terms, Edwards report supported a dissolution program, not necessarily 
limited to the top-holding companies, but also inclusive of interlocking directorates, contractual and service 
Figure 1  Organization of the GHQ
Source: Eleanor M. Hadley, Memoir of a Trustbuster, p. 63.
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arrangements, procedures for opening up combine patents, oversized operating companies, and removing 
zaibatsu families and those close to them from business for a 10-year period.44） In this sense, the program 
for dissolution of the zaibatsu became far more thorough and punitive than the Yasuda Plan.
 However, MacArthur did not share the views of the Edwards mission. SCAP’s comments on May 17, 1946, 
underlined that “the objectives of the report are admirable in purpose, but the practical execution of [it]… 
is beyond the size and organization of the Occupation Forces.” It further questioned, “whether the purpose 
of the occupation is to establish an ideal economy here or whether it is merely to provide the introduction 
of such democratic methods and the abolition of such menaces as to ensure the disability of Japan to make 
future war.” Chief of the ESS, William Marquat also stressed that recommendations of the report might 
penalize the industry.45） Therefore, MacArthur and the ESS favored a plan which introduces democratic 
methods to Japan, and regarded the report merely as “a guiding study.”46）
 Meanwhile, Japanese Imperial Order No. 233 was ﬁnally promulgated on April 20, 1946, ﬁve months after 
the SCAPIN 244 instructed the Japanese government to implement the Yasuda Plan. Order No. 233 estab-
lished the Holding Company Liquidation Commission (HCLC), a Japanese organization to dissolve the 
zaibatsu holding companies. The HCLC started the dissolution but limited it to the “top holding compa-
nies” and ignored the dissolution of “zaibatsu-controlled enterprises.”47） In other words, the objective of JCS 
1380/15, which stressed the need for “striking the head of the ‘octopus’ (top holding companies) and sev-
ering its ‘legs’ (zaibatsu-controlled enterprises) to eradicate the inﬂuence of the zaibatsu from the Japanese 
economy, was disregarded by HCLC.48）
 As mentioned before, the ESS and MacArthur were content with an introductive plan that was put into 
motion by the Japanese government. Therefore, they did not order Japanese government to change the 
direction of the policies implemented by the HCLC. However, the New Dealers within the GHQ, such as 
Eleanor M. Hadley was against such a plan. Hadley sent a memorandum on June 12, 1946 to the 
Government Section and criticized the Imperial Order No. 233. She recommended to change the HCLC 
plan and implement the measures drawn up in the JCS 1380/15 instead.49） Hadley memo convinced the 
Government Section to implement the punitive measures and forced the Economic and Scientiﬁc Section 
to change its position. On July 23, forty days after the memo, the ESS sent SCAPIN 1079 “Ordinances and 
Regulations Affecting the Holding Company Liquidation Commission” and ordered the HCLC to dissolve 
both the top holding companies and their controlled enterprises.50） Even though MacArthur and the 
Economic and Scientiﬁc Section favored a mild-reform program, the New Dealers pushed for comprehen-
sive economic reforms and inﬂuenced the policy formulation. New Deal thinking was so inﬂuential that a 
famous New Dealer and the Deputy Chief of the Government Section, Charles Kades called SCAPIN 1079 
as “Hadley Directive.”51）
 Yet, why did MacArthur, who is deﬁnitely not a New Dealer, agree to implement these policies in the ﬁrst 
place? Was it because he was a military man who was obligated to follow the orders of Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, or were there any other reasons? The short answer to these questions lies in the decision-making 
process of the occupation.
 During the occupation, MacArthur was the decision-maker which meant every part of the reform plan 
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had to be approved by him before becoming a SCAPIN to the Japanese government. However, considering 
the massive amount of reports and time restrictions, it was not possible for MacArthur to digest every 
piece of information ﬂowing through Special Sections to his ofﬁce. For this reason, MacArthur chose to 
delegate freely to his section chiefs. He made decisions after reading a one-page abstract or summary pre-
pared by staff ofﬁcers.52） This meant that not only the Chiefs of the Special Sections but any ofﬁcer had a 
chance to inﬂuence the reform programs if they can create plausible arguments based on the objectives 
mentioned in JCS 1380/15 and convince their superiors.53） Therefore, JCS 1380/15 –a product of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal era– programmed the operations of GHQ with respect to the Japanese from top to 
bottom and inﬂuenced the policy formulation progress. As Theodore Cohen of the Economic and Scientiﬁc 
Section mentioned, everyone referred to the JCS 1380/15, he recalled: “I cannot remember anyone in 
GHQ ever referring to the State Department’s policy paper [SWNCC 150/4/A].”54）
 New Dealers who rooted for comprehensive reformation of Japanese economic, social, and political struc-
tures, could succeed to inﬂuence the policy formulation process. After their intervention on July 23, 1946, 
the Holding Companies Liquidation Commission designated 83 ﬁrms as holding companies which were 
composed of ten zaibatsu head companies (honsha), their related holding companies, and local holding 
companies. By the end of 1947, forty-two companies were dissolved, and the remaining forty-one were 
reorganized and their activities were severely restricted.55）
 On top of that, New Dealers continued pushing for other reforms. The Capital Levy Law, No. 52 which 
devised a graduated tax on individuals – especially the wealthy population –, was imposed on November 
11, 1946.56） On January 4, 1947, economic purge which purged the ofﬁcials of the 250 designated compa-
nies from any position in public service and from the directorship in any formerly zaibatsu-connected com-
panies, was issued. Then, on April 14, 1947, Anti-Monopoly Law was enacted by Japanese Diet to prevent 
the reappearance of any tendencies toward monopolies.57） On July 3, Edward Welsh, the New Dealer head 
of the Antitrust and the Cartels Division of the ESS, prepared SCAPIN 1741 which dissolved two giant 
zaibatsu companies, Mitsui Co. and Mitsubishi Trading by direct action by the Occupation authorities.58）
 The last of these measures was the “Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power Law, also 
known as “Deconcentration Law.” On December 18, 1947, Deconcentration Law – based on the recommen-
dations of the Edwards report of March 1946 – passed the Diet under strong pressure from the 
Occupation authorities.59） The law ordered a comprehensive “breaking-up” of all big companies in Japan to 
allow small-medium businesses to compete in the market. With the promulgation of the law, nearly all of 
the punitive measures were put into motion before the end of 1947. However, around the same time, many 
American businessmen started showing discontent for the economic policies of the SCAP. The economic 
distress in Japan and the concerns by American pressure groups over the economic policies sparked dis-
cussions for changing occupation policies.
III The Criticism of the SCAP Economic Policies under the Looming Cold War
 The social, political, and economic reformation of Japan made a sound start in late 1945. By the end of 
1946, the ultra-nationalists and militarists were purged, the new Constitution, the Labor Standards Act, and 
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the Farm Land Reform Law were promulgated. The vast socio-political reform agenda was devised and 
implemented within a short time span and achieved remarkable success.
 Despite its success in the socio-political reforms, the occupation was not without criticism. During 1947, 
Japanese economy did not show any promise of economic recovery or self-sufﬁciency. Industrial produc-
tion was low, the raw materials were scarce, and the reparations were still incomplete. Civil unrest, labor 
strikes, and the unprecedented inﬂation worsened the situation. Without recovery, Japanese economy 
became more and more dependent on American Government Aid Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) to 
survive. The low prospects of the future Japanese economy raised eyebrows in the American business 
world which eventually beckoned an intervention by Washington.
A. Economic Distress in Japan
 In 1947, the Japanese economy was in an abysmal state. GNP in 1947 was only slightly over 50 percent 
of the 1937 level. The index of real income stood at 54.9 percent (61.1 according to some sources) in 1947, 
as against 100 in 1934-1936. All raw materials were in extremely short supply, and by October 1947 the 
total production of coal and electricity fell below the level considered the critical minimum. Japanese 
people lingered on the line of semi-starvation since the food supplies had fallen very low to support only 
1,042 calories per capita per day for the urban consumer.60）
 On top of these, the inﬂation rate, which was uncontrolled during the early years of the occupation, bal-
looned and averaged 700 percent through mid-1946.61） The value of yen dropped drastically as a result of 
unchecked inﬂation. According to a prominent scholar, 1 dollar was equal to 2 yen before the war. 
However, by 1947, 1 dollar became equal to almost 270 yen.62） Japan had never before experienced an inﬂa-
tion as extreme as that.63） In the meantime, the foreign trade suffered greatly. Japan’s exports crashed to a 
mere 3.9 percent and its imports 8.8 percent of prewar levels. (Table 1) The production output was 
nowhere near the prewar levels, yet the population steadily increased after around 6 million repatriates 
return to Japan.64）
Table 1  Postwar Economic Index (1934-1936 Levels=100 percent)
1934-1936 1946 1947 1948 1949
Real National Income 100 57.6 61.1 71.5 82.6
Standard of Living (Urban) 100 – 56.0 62.0 66.0
Population 100 109.7 113.6 116.4 119.0
Export Volume 100 3.9 6.6 9.8 17.5
Import Volume 100 8.8 15.1 19.7 29.0
Production (Mining & Manufacturing) 100 31.0 37.8 58.4 69.2
Production (Farm, Forestry, and Fishery) 100 78.1 80.0 92.0 93.1
Source:  Based on the data provided in Hidezo Inaba, “Problems of Economic Recovery and Self-Support,” Japan Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 2, 
April-June 1955, pp. 148-158
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 In light of these, SCAP directed Japanese government to establish the Economic Stabilization Board (ESB) 
to coordinate the economic planning in May 1946. The newly established board found out that Japan had a 
massive demand and an insufﬁcient supply. Therefore, Japanese government tried to increase the produc-
tion levels to meet the domestic demand. To achieve this, the ESB recommended a “priority production” 
(Keishaseisan) strategy and encouraged Japanese companies to produce more. However, Japanese compa-
nies did not have any capital to replace the old and broken equipment or buy new machinery that was 
required to increase their production levels. To overcome this problem, the Japanese government set up 
the Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB) in October 1946. The bank issued 44 billion yen in loans through 
1947 to these companies. The actions taken by the Japanese government helped increase production but 
also fueled inﬂation since Japanese government had to print out and pump more bills into the domestic 
market.65）
 Economic distress in Japan led to the so-called “October offensive.” In October 1946, an extremely left-
wing Sanbetsu66） (All-Japan Congress of Industrial Unions, also called as the National Congress of Industrial 
Unions) started a series of strikes and production control tactics. The union demanded a basic minimum 
wage plus the abolition of the income tax on labor and stressed that the demonstrations would not stop 
until their demands were met. Later, Sanbetsu called for a general national strike in February 1947, but it 
was banned by SCAP’s orders to prevent the crumbling Japanese economy further paralyzing itself.67） Even 
though the general strike was banned during its inception, its rippling effects were imminent. SCAP real-
ized that the civil unrest could cause other occupation reforms to fail. Thus, reconsideration of the liberal/
New Dealer reform programs has started. As early as 1948, some of the rights that were given to unions 
by reforms, were restricted to contain the civil unrest.
 Under these circumstances, the economic recovery and “self-sustainability” plans for Japan surfaced. To 
begin with, George E. Blakeslee wrote a report after his visit to Japan between December 26, 1945 and 
February 13, 1946. In his report, Blakeslee underlined that to achieve the democratization of Japan, “it is 
essential to prevent economic distress for Japanese.” He thought that the immediate problem in Japan was 
economic and argued “a sane democracy cannot rest on an empty stomach.” Blakeslee recommended that 
“to safeguard the American type of democracy in Japan … the United States should prevent acute food 
shortage and should help the Japanese revive their industries and their export trade.” He further stressed 
that as pre-requisites, the stabilization of Japanese currency and especially an initial decision on repara-
tions will be almost necessary.”68）
 In addition, T.A. Bisson of the Government Section (GS) wrote a memo for Courtney Whitney, Chief of 
the GS on October 23, 1946. In his report, Bisson stressed that the Japanese authorities were intentionally 
pursuing policies – priority production strategy and Reconstruction Finance Bank loans – that invites inﬂa-
tion rather than averting it. Bisson warned that unless the runaway inﬂation was brought under control, 
civil unrest would cause the emergence of extremist control which will eventually impede the reform poli-
cies. Echoing the recommendations of Blakeslee, Bisson advocated a comprehensive program of price 
stabilization to solve the inﬂation problem and get rid of its threat to occupation objectives.69）
 Furthermore, Edward M. Martin, Chief of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs of the 
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State Department, wrote a memorandum to General Hilldring on March 12, 1947. Martin considered that 
economic recovery plans for Japan would create the impetus of nurturing a peaceful and democratic Japan. 
Martin argued that if Japan were provided with food and raw materials in 1948 and 1949, Japan could be 
“cranked up” to the point where she might be self-supporting in 1950. He pointed out that with enough 
food and raw materials aid, Japanese industries could produce more and export the excess to other Far 
Eastern countries.70） By doing so, Martin continued, Japan might break out from the vicious cycle where 
the food and raw material shortages deteriorate Japanese economy and culminate in a more dependent 
Japan to the U.S. aid. Research and Statistics Division of the Economic and the Scientiﬁc Section prepared 
a report on August 1, 1947 and echoed the same point of view. The report underlined that Japan would 
become more dependent on U.S. aid unless Japanese industrial output and foreign trade volume were 
increased.
 Shortly after Edward Martin memo, MacArthur hinted the possibility of an early peace during an interview 
with press correspondents on March 19, 1947. He divided the occupation into three phases – military, 
political, and economic – and claimed that the ﬁrst phase is already completed and the political phase is 
approaching completion. However, MacArthur continued, the economic recovery of Japan cannot be 
achieved by the occupation authorities as long as Japan economically blocked by the Allied Powers.71） 
Therefore, he recommended to allow Japan to trade with the world, without restrictions applied by the 
occupation apparatus, and to restore Japan’s production to self-sufﬁciency levels. In regard to the repara-
tions, MacArthur implicitly suggested that reparations burden should be reduced unless the United States 
was prepared to support Japan economically for many years to come.72）
 In the meantime, the U.S. stance against reparations policy started to change. In the spring of 1947, War 
Department sent the Overseas Consultants Incorporation (OCI), headed by Clifford Strike to Japan. On 
paper, Strike mission’s objective was to provide technical assistance to SCAP ofﬁcials on reparation 
removal levels. However, in reality, Strike was in favor of reducing the reparations while increasing the 
retention levels of the Japanese industry. During his stay, Strike recommended limiting the reparations to 
primary war facilities category, while keeping the non-war related industries intact.73） As an expected 
result, OCI sent a report to MacArthur on February 18, 1947 and recommended higher retention levels for 
Japanese industries to achieve self-sufﬁciency levels.74） Only a month and a half later, SWNCC 236/43 
established new reparation levels for Japanese industries. The new ﬁgures were far more lenient towards 
Japanese industry than the Pauley recommendations of 1946.75）
 Another supporter of the economic recovery was Under Secretary of the State Dean Acheson. On May 
8, 1947, Acheson stood before the Delta Council76） in Cleveland and made an epoch-making speech about 
the “workshops in Europe and Asia.” Acheson pointed out that “until the various countries of the world get 
on their feet and become self-supporting there can be no political or economic stability in the world and no 
lasting peace or prosperity for any of us.” He buttressed his point with the argument that the total volume 
of U.S. exports will not increase until the U.S. accepts increased imports from the world. To achieve eco-
nomic recovery around the world, Acheson recommended reconstructing the “two great workshops of 
Europe and Asia – Germany and Japan – upon which the fate of the two continents largely depends.”77） 
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Acheson linked the recovery of Japan to the recovery of the international economy and favored changes in 
occupation policies.
 Complementing the Acheson’s point, Political Advisor to Macarthur (POLAD), George Atcheson wrote 
to Truman on June 19, 1947. Atcheson warned Truman of the situation in Japan: “Japan, whether we like it 
or not, has become an economic responsibility of the United States …. It is to our interest to assist in the 
process of getting the country on at least a minimum self-supporting basis.”78）The report also underlined 
that self-supporting Japanese economy cannot be achieved unless a foreign exchange (U.S. dollar) to 
ﬁnance the essential imports is secured and adequate imports of essential raw materials are obtained.79） 
Atcheson’s comment was integral since his opinions were close to the China Crowd’s. However, the wors-
ening situation in Japan paved the way for Atcheson to conform, at least, regarding punitive economic 
measures that were being taken in occupation.
 All of these arguments amounted to an action by State and Army Departments to review the occupation 
policies and change their direction. By October 9, 1947, both State and Army Departments agreed to make 
Japan self-supporting. Although the implementation of the recovery program remained disputed, State and 
Army Departments reached an agreement to put more emphasis on the economic recovery.80） On the one 
hand, the State Department backed SWNCC 381 – prepared by Edward Martin – which favored the revi-
talization of Japanese economy based on the Acheson’s speech in May. The State Department rejected 
unilateral action on the issues of reparations and deconcentration (FEC-230) and rooted for achieving con-
sensus on Far Eastern Commission on these issues. The State Department employed this deliberate 
approach not to irk the Far Eastern Countries which dreaded the resurgence of Japanese aggression.
 On the other hand, Under Secretary of the Army, William Draper was considering to bypass the Far 
Eastern Commission and the involvement of other nations. Draper thought about making further cuts in 
reparations levels designated in SWNCC 236/43 and revising the FEC-230 policy by sending unilateral 
directives to MacArthur. After his return from a trip to Japan in September 1947, Draper launched a cam-
paign for an overhauling reorientation of American Occupation policy. He directed the Army Department to 
formulate a new policy which would make “economic recovery the main objective and … give SCAP the 
authority to interpret other existing directives [FEC-230 and SWNCC 236/43] in light of this primary 
objective.” On October 3, SWNCC 384 titled “The Economic Recovery of Japan,” was completed and ready 
for consideration by other Departments.81）
 Even though the means for economic recovery remained disputed among the Departments of State and 
Army, one thing was crystal clear: The economic democratization, including the deconcentration and repa-
ration programs, lost its vigor little by little and eventually became bogged down in late 1947 while the 
economic recovery gained utmost importance. The economic distress in Japan combined with the civil 
unrest, became the driving force for recovery plans within Washington and GHQ. In addition, the con-
cerns over international economy pushed the decision-makers to fortify the Japanese and German econo-
mies to overcome the probable future problems.
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B. The Role of American Pressure Groups on Policy Reversals
 Howard Schonberger, a prominent scholar, stressed the role of the American pressure groups – or “Japan 
Lobby” – in providing a major impetus behind the reorientation of reform policies for the Occupied Japan. 
According to Schonberger, “the reorientation [of policies] was … aided by Newsweek magazine, led by old 
Japanese hands of the State Department [Joseph Grew], and backed by major corporations with investments 
in Japan and friends among the zaibatsu.” (Emphasis added) Its program included the ending of repara-
tions, the suppression of reform in the name of recovery, and the reinstatement of the zaibatsu leaders 
purged by MacArthur. The Japan Lobby was a small and loosely connected group of individuals who oper-
ated behind the scenes most of the time.82） But that doesn’t mean their impact on the policy changes was 
minuscule.
 One of the most inﬂuential groups in the Japan Lobby was the Newsweek magazine. Newsweek was founded 
in 1937 with the funds and encouragement of Averell Harriman, heir to the Union Paciﬁc Railroad fortune 
and partner in the Wall Street investment house of Brown Brothers. Three key players used Newsweek as 
a platform to raise concerns over occupation policies. The brains of the operation was Harry Kern, a 
young Harvard graduate. Kern joined Newsweek in 1937 and rose to the position of the foreign editor after 
Pearl Harbor.83） Two other players, Compton Pakenham and James Lee Kauffman, were included to the 
team later on. Pakenham fed news from Japan to Washington as a correspondent, while Kauffman contrib-
uted sensational reports and insights. All three took part in challenging the U.S. Occupation policies by 
contributing to the articles published in Newsweek.
 The scoops about the occupation policies started when Kern appointed Compton Pakenham, a former 
journalist of New York Times, and an ultra-conservative who has connections with the high-level Japanese 
ofﬁcials, as the Tokyo correspondent for Newsweek. After his dispatch to Tokyo in the spring of 1946, 
Pakenham tried to contact with his prewar Japanese friends who were high-ranking ofﬁcials in the govern-
ment. However, he learned that members of the old-bureaucracy (nationalists and militarists) were purged 
by January 1946. In addition, Pakenham was unhappy with the SCAP’s decision to permit Japanese com-
munists to return to the public life. Discontent with the conditions in Japan, Pakenham sent a message to 
the Kern on July 24, 1946, telling him that “the occupation is failing, failing, failing.”84）
 Some high-ranking American bureaucrats, too, were unhappy with the situation in Japan. One of these 
people, Averell Harriman, the new secretary of commerce, met frequently with Kern in the fall of 1946. 
During these meetings, Harriman emphasized that the economic democratization policies delayed the 
Japanese economy’s ability to reach self-sufﬁciency levels, and hindered her role as an anti-Communist 
bastion in Asia.85）
 After many meetings with Harriman and hearing from Pakenham about a SCAP plan for the economic 
purge of business executives, Kern decided to put a story in Newsweek on January 27, 1947.86） The story 
criticized the economic purge and claimed that purge program disposed of the capable “brains of the entire 
Japanese structure.” In addition, it strengthened the socialistic tendencies while undermining the American 
capitalist principles in Japan.87） Kern claimed that 30,000 businessmen were to be purged after the SCAP’s 
directive. However, the economic purge affected only 1,555 business people, a far less ﬁgure than the 
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Newsweek report claimed.88） Regardless, the report heralded the future criticism of the occupation policies.
 The report that James Lee Kauffman published in Newsweek was more sensational than Kern’s. Kauffman, 
a founding member of the American Council of Japan, had represented virtually every major American 
corporation in Japan, including General Electric, Standard Oil, Libby-Owens-Ford, and Dillon, Read & 
Company. Before the war started, Kauffman worked as a lawyer in Japan, representing these companies 
and protecting their interests. In August 1947, he came to Japan as a member of the Second Strike 
Mission on reparations, and while in Japan, acquired a copy of top-secret policy document FEC-230 from 
an ofﬁcer in GHQ.89） After his trip, Kauffman published a report on the December 1, 1947 issue of 
Newsweek, in which he claimed that reform policies would make Japan a less attractive place for American 
investment because the economic democratization policies were stripping the Japanese economy of older 
men of ability and experience.90）
 Kauffman further argued that FEC-230 and the Deconcentration Bill was standing on a “socialistic ideal,” 
and if fully implemented, would lead to the collapse of the Japanese economy. Kauffman was anxious that 
Deconcentration Bill not only dissolves the holding companies at the apex of the combines but also split all 
big businesses into smaller businesses. He described this situation as “radical reformists were using Japan 
as a ‘laboratory’ for their ‘experiments’ and pushing for an anti-American economic system in Japan.”91） 
Kauffman thought that if Deconcentration Bill was enacted, it would discourage the Japanese business, 
lower the production levels, worsen the economic prospects, and undermine Japan’s potential as America’s 
“Far Eastern bastion” against the Communist threat. Most importantly this situation would make the 
conduct of American business in Japan impossible.
 In addition, the “burdens of the occupation” for American taxpayers, became a hot topic of the public 
debates in the wake of the Kauffman report. Kauffman argued Japan was costing the American taxpayers 
millions of dollars a year in form of payments for food and other necessities to Japan (Table 2). Kauffman 
hinted that American taxpayer will continue to pay for these payments unless Japan gets out of the eco-
nomic quagmire. Yet, in reality, the ﬁnancial burdens of the occupation were being assumed by the 
Japanese government (Table 3). Moreover, the ﬁnancial burden of aiding Japan was not overwhelming for 
Table 2  U.S. Apportioned Aid (Million Dollars; U.S. Fiscal Years)
1945-46 1946-47 1947-48 1948-49
208 294 357 530
Source: Robert A. Fearey, The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-50, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1950, p. 218.
Table 3  Japanese Costs for the Support of the Occupation Forces (Japanese Fiscal Years)
1946-1947 1947-48 1948-49
Million Yen 39,600 64,121 107,062
Percent of the Total Budget 33% 30% 23%
Source: Robert A. Fearey, The Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-50, New York: The MacMillan Company, 1950, p. 219.
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the United States, compared with the U.S. aid extended to Germany.
 Curiously, some argued that Kauffman was criticizing SCAP policies not because there was a serious 
socialistic tendency or a particular communism threat in Japan. Rather he was employing such a jargon to 
protect their clients’ interests. One of the skeptics, Theodore Cohen, argued that “Kauffman was a lawyer 
for the Libby-Owens-Ford Company, which had a substantial interest in Nippon Sheet Glass Company, a 
monopoly then being broken up by the Occupation.”92） A report prepared by Charles Kades, Deputy Chief 
of the Government Section, too, criticized the Kauffman report and underlined that the Libby-Owens-Ford 
Glass Company was the second largest stockholder (42,000 shares) in Nippon Sheet Glass Company.93）
Kauffman’s comments about a serious drop in industrial output as a result of the economic purge were 
also baseless. Cohen argued that the industrial output showed an increase between 1946 and 1948, con-
trary to the Kauffman’s claims.94） Parallel to these, Eleanor Hadley argued that the Japanese Communist 
Party (JCP) expressed discontent with the SCAP policies, especially the Deconcentration Bill which 
Kauffman vigorously labeled as “socialistic.” While Kauffman claimed that the deconcentration of Japanese 
businesses would become a hindsight for the foreign investment, the JCP saw the legislation as a means of 
inducing foreign capital.95）
 Even though it is highly debatable, the inﬂuence of communism in Japan was not a daunting problem in 
1947. The only exception of this was the general strike in 1947 which was nipped in the bud by a SCAP 
directive. The reason behind this argument is that Japan was not as important as China or Korea for the 
Soviet policy-makers. Effectively barred from taking an active role in the occupation, Soviets recognized 
that further efforts to increase their inﬂuence in Japan would have little effect. Therefore, the Japanese 
Communist Party was allowed to function without any attempt at systematic guidance and control from 
Moscow, at least until 1950.96）
 Apart from these, Senator William Knowland of California obtained a copy of “top-secret” FEC-230 from 
Undersecretary of the Army, William Draper97） on December 15, 1947. Four days after, he made a speech 
in the congress and claimed that “FEC-230 and other policies being followed in Japan go far beyond the 
breaking up cartels and trusts.” After Deconcentration Law was promulgated by the Japanese government 
in mid-December 1947, Knowland attacked this policy for a second time on January 19, 1948. Knowland 
stressed that “FEC-230 and certain other policies go far, very far, beyond trust-busting … It seems to me 
that in both Germany and Japan, our policy should be to eliminate trusts and cartels, but not to promote 
socialism...”98） Knowland, similar to Kern and Kauffman, was concerned that Japan was drifting into social-
ism little by little under the Occupation reforms. What is not mentioned by many is that the Republican 
member of the Senate, William Knowland was one of the “cotton senators.” He was also a member of the 
Senate Appropriations Committee and was lobbying the Pentagon to develop the Japanese textile industry 
as a major foreign purchaser of the American cotton.99）
 Japanese textile sector whose revival was desired by Knowland was not performing well after the war. 
The scrapping of the textile machinery for war effort reduced the output capacity of the industry. Cotton 
mills had one-ﬁfth of the number of spindles they had in 1937, while rayon capacity dropped to one-third of 
the 1938 level. The silk industry capacity was hit hardest, its capacity dropping to one-seventh of the 
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prewar levels.100） The general economic distress and scarce raw materials caused the textile output to 
plummet, while the high inﬂation levels prevented the necessary repairs for the machinery. Moreover, the 
reparations problem was hanging over the textile industry – especially the rayon industry which was sus-
pected of having a war potential – like a sword of Damocles. Unlike the heavy industry, the textile was not 
a main target of the deconcentration program. Yet, some textile ﬁrms were marked as potential targets for 
the deconcentration, furthering the uncertainties over the textile sector.
 For these reasons, Knowland attacked the deconcentration program in Congress. Like Kauffman, 
Knowland denounced the deconcentration plan as “socialistic,” and employed the fear of expanding social-
ist inﬂuence to achieve personal goals. He openly criticized these policies to create the conditions that 
were necessary to sell excess American cotton to the Japanese market. However, arguments of Kauffman 
and Knowland were biased and based on false information. The Deconcentration plan aimed to break up 
Japanese business into small but highly competitive units. But, according to Kazuo Kawaii, it was hardly 
socialistic.101）Also, the New Dealers within the GHQ were not “experimenting” or going beyond trustbust-
ing and promoting socialism. New Dealers were just following liberal reform programs drawn by 1380/15 
which was prepared in Washington and directed as the occupation policy.
 In short, economic distress, civil unrest, numerous strike movements, and inﬂation problems in Japan 
created deep concerns among American businessmen. Starting from 1947, three leading ﬁgures in the 
Japan Lobby, tried to clear the ambiguities over the economic democratization program of the Occupation. 
They favored revitalization of the economy and drew attention to the problems in Japan while employing 
Cold War terminology to fortify their arguments.
 The reports published in Newsweek triggered vigorous debates in American congress and among top 
decision makers. First, Knowland joined their ranks and targeted FEC-230, and then William Draper con-
ﬁrmed the accuracy of the Kauffman report to Secretary of Defense James F. Forrestal (a former partner 
in Dillon, Read&Co.). Draper agreed to the conclusions by Kauffman because he had similar impressions 
after visiting Japan in September 1947. Consequently, Draper proposed a revision of the deconcentration 
bill and “the need for carrying out the zaibatsu program in such a way as to promote rather than hinder 
Japanese recovery.”102） To achieve these goals, Draper was sent to Japan to study and make recommenda-
tions on economy policies in Japan.
IV Entrenchment of Economic Recovery, 1948-49
 The year 1948 marked maybe the most critical year of the occupation. Liberal reform programs of the 
Occupation were canceled or reversed unilaterally by Washington. The Draper-Johnston mission and their 
ﬁndings minimized the reparation levels while the Deconcentration Review Board mitigated the impact of 
the deconcentration program. Meanwhile, other nations, especially the ones in Far Eastern Commission 
expressed strong disapproval of the actions of the United States. Yet, they were completely disregarded by 
U.S.
 The Secretary of Army Kenneth Royall speech on January 6 signaled the ﬁrst drastic changes in the U.S. 
stance against the economic democratization policies. In San Francisco, Royall told “new conditions have 
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arisen--in world politics and economics … [and] these changes must now be fully taken into account in 
determining our future course [of Japan].” What Royall was trying to say is that U.S. ofﬁcials were facing 
a dilemma. In this dilemma, the United States could not afford to leave the Japanese war-making system 
intact, but they could not afford to sterilize the business ability of Japan either. Royall mentioned that “the 
dissolution policies did not present a serious economic problem,” he went on, “but extreme decentraliza-
tion of industry, while further impairing the ability to make war, may at the same time impair manufactur-
ing efﬁciency and reduce the overall production and the exportable surplus of Japanese industry. 
Therefore, this situation might postpone the day when Japan can become self-supporting.” To clear the 
ambiguities over the direction of the occupation policies, Royall claimed that the deconcentration program 
could be modiﬁed to ensure the Japanese economic recovery in line with the interests of broad U.S. objec-
tives. In other words, Royall implied the need for the reversal of deconcentration policies to make Japan 
self-supporting and prevent her from becoming a ﬁnancial burden to the United States.103）
 The other harbinger of the reversal of policies was Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, the U.S. representative 
and the chairman of the Far Eastern Commission. In his speech on January 21, 1948, McCoy used a tone 
similar to the Royall’s and explained that the economic chaos in Japan has been prevented by the U.S. 
ﬁnancial aid. He thought an early revival of the Japanese economy on a peaceful, self-supporting basis was 
needed to eliminate the burden on the American taxpayers. Moreover, bits of the McCoy’s speech resem-
bled the Acheson’s, repeating the need to make Japan self-sustainable to contribute its part to the rehabili-
tation of world economy.104）
 Meanwhile, Gen. MacArthur was planning to propose the establishment of a board to review the ongoing 
economic reform programs in Japan. As early as November 25, 1947, MacArthur prepared the draft of 
such proposal upon receiving criticism on the economy policies.105） After the speeches by Royall and 
McCoy, MacArthur thought that the time was ripe to send a radio message to the Department of the 
Army. On January 26, 1948, MacArthur requested a group of ﬁve outstanding individuals to review the 
decisions of the Holding Companies Liquidation Commission on excessive concentrations of the economic 
power. The authority of the board was limited to prepare reports for the SCAP and decide whether the 
decisions of HCLC have good or bad effects for the Japanese economy.106）
 MacArthur tried to clear the criticism leveled against the deconcentration program by making such a 
proposal. However, this did not necessarily mean that MacArthur was against “breaking-up” of the exces-
sive economic power. In February 1948, SCAP directed the Holding Companies Liquidation Commission to 
designate 257 mining and manufacturing companies, in addition to 68 distribution and service companies 
(325 at total) as excessive concentrations.107） This last move raised the concerns over the Japanese 
economy and eventually led to an intervention by George Kennan and William Draper to investigate the 
situation in Japan.
A. Draper – Johnston Mission and the Changes in the Reparation Policies
 William Henry Draper, Jr., was one of the most important ﬁgures that helped to change the occupation 
policies to ensure the economic recovery in Japan. After the end of WWII, he worked as the chief of 
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Economics Division, Control Council for Germany, where he vigorously fought against the Morgenthau 
Plan. From the start, Draper criticized the de-industrialization of the German economy and supported the 
plans for recovery. After his return from Germany, he was appointed as the Under Secretary of War for 
Kenneth Royall in 1947. Shortly after the War Department’s transition to Army Department in 1947, 
Draper became the ﬁrst Under Secretary of the Army.108）
 Prior to his dispatch, Draper did not possess much knowledge about Japan. However, Draper had become 
convinced from what he had known in Germany that the orders concerning the economy of Japan had to 
be changed. The campaigns to break-up excessive concentration of the economy disturbed him the most 
during a visit to Japan in September 1947. Therefore, he wanted to make sure that deconcentration poli-
cies would cease and Japan would be revitalized. Draper invited a group of businessmen to join his envoy 
to buttress his own recommendations to the President and the Secretary of State and the Congress to 
change the instructions to MacArthur in Japan. Thus, it became clear that Draper was not going Japan just 
to investigate the general economic situation, rather, he was planning to alter the reparations and the 
deconcentration plans.109）
 The group of businessmen who joined the Draper was known as the Johnston Committee. The Johnston 
Committee consisted of Percy H. Johnston, chairman of the Chemical Bank and Trust Co., Paul G. 
Hoffman, formerly president of Studebaker, who had been named administrator of the European Recovery 
Program, Robert F. Loree, chairman of the National Foreign Trade Council and formerly vice president of 
the Guaranty Trust Company, and Sidney H. Scheuer, senior partner of Scheuer and Co. The mission 
stayed in Japan between March 20 and April 2 and compiled a report for the Secretary of State. It was later 
published as the Johnston Report on May 18, 1948.110）
 The Johnston report laid out that there are three obstacles to achieve economic recovery in Japan: (1) 
lack of raw materials, (2) bad condition of existing factories, and (3) the poor state of transport. It under-
lined that these obstacles weigh down the desire to produce, work, plan, and invest more in Japan. 
Furthermore, the threat of removal for reparations hangs over much of Japan’s industry, especially heavy 
industry, worsening the economic situation. Jerome B. Cohen explained the arguments of the committee as 
follows:
Insufﬁcient essential raw materials result in insufﬁcient production; insufﬁcient production results in 
insufﬁcient exports; insufﬁcient exports result in insufﬁcient foreign exchange to pay for the neces-
sary raw materials. Until this circle is broken Japan’s economy will remain prostrate and dependent 
upon a food dole [GARIAO] such as the United States is presently supplying. The best way to break 
the circle is to supply sufﬁcient dollar exchange to enable Japan to purchase the initial foreign raw 
materials.111）
 In addition to the raw materials scarcity issue, the Johnston committee criticized the reparations policies 
as well. The committee warned that reparations cannot be made without damaging the peacetime indus-
trial potential of Japan. Which meant that, as long as the reparations continued, the Japan’s ability to self-
sustain was postponed. And if done as a punitive measure, the committee claimed that the United States 
would have to pay the real price of the reparations, because it was the United States which extended relief 
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to Japan and would be doing so for a long time unless Japan became self-sufﬁcient.
 The logic behind these warnings was simple; increasing the production was the sure method to induce 
industrial recovery. Therefore, to assure the recovery of the Japanese economy, the report argued that 
reparations must be minimized and concluded in a rapid manner. Johnston Committee recommended to 
retain the Japanese industries and remove only the excess capacity. Most interestingly, the committee pro-
posed further cuts in the reparation levels proposal of the Overseas Consultants Incorporated112） (2nd Strike 
Mission Report) and extended these cuts to the primary war facilities for the ﬁrst time (Table 4). Hence, 
the main belief and the objective of destroying the war-making capacity of Japan to prevent her from 
becoming a menace to the world order started eroding. In other words, the hatred against the ex-enemy 
started to soften and evolve into benign relations.
Table 4  Recommended Removals for Reparations (millions of yen in 1939 prices)
Industrial Equipment Military Equipment Total
Pauley Report
(April 1946)   990  1,476 2,466
2nd Strike Report
(March 1948) 172 1,476 1,648
Johnston Report
(May 1948) 102 560 662
Actual Removal
(Up until Spring of 1949) 160
Source: Shigeto Tsuru, Essays on Economic Development, Tokyo: Kinokuniya, 1968, p.179.
 Johnston report also mentioned the perils of the deconcentration program. Similar to the reparations issue, 
the committee perceived the deconcentration program as a big uncertainty for Japanese businesses that 
crippled the economic recovery process. The report recommended that “the period of uncertainty caused 
by this economic reform should be made short and the area of uncertainty lessened as rapidly as possi-
ble.” Moreover, they recommended that reorganization of big companies “must be limited to the minimum 
necessary to ensure reasonable competition.” Therefore, an overhauling deconcentration program was not 
favored by the Johnston Committee.
 Recommendations of Johnston report tremendously mitigated the reparations levels in accordance with 
the Draper’s objectives. Total reparations levels that were designated in Pauley Report dropped to one-
tenth for industrial equipment, and one-quarter for military equipment in the wake of recommendations by 
Johnston committee. After the realization of this ﬁrst step, Draper toiled for removing the second obstacle 
for economic recovery. For this reason, he sent the Deconcentration Review Board to Japan to devise a 
reversal of the deconcentration program.
B. Deconcentration Law and Its Moderation
 The promulgation of the Deconcentration Law indicated that the economic democratization programs 
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nearly reached completion. However, by that time, the dissenters of the program and their active criticism 
in the printed media and the congress started casting a shadow over the feasibility of deconcentration. 
After consecutive criticism by American pressure groups and speeches by Kenneth Royall and Frank 
McCoy, MacArthur ﬁnally decided to send a telegram to Washington, proposing the establishment of a 
Deconcentration Review Board (DRB). But this did not mean that General was trying to reverse the 
deconcentration policies. On the contrary, MacArthur tried to create a suitable environment for reform 
policies by reducing the criticism over the deconcentration. Hence, MacArthur proposed establishing a 
Deconcentration Review Board to examine the outcomes of that program.
 As expected, SCAP directed the Holding Company Liquidation Commission (HCLC) for execution of the 
law shortly after the telegram. The Holding Companies Liquidation Commission designated 325 ﬁrms as 
possible excessive concentrations of economic power subject to reorganization. The designated companies 
in February 1948, represented nearly 75 percent of all Japanese industry and commerce.113） The programs 
for the economic democratization of Japan were about to be completed after two-and-a-half year the occu-
pation started.
 Meanwhile, the direction of the occupation policies greatly changed with the Draper-Johnston mission. 
After the Johnston report’s recommendations of limiting the reparations and minimizing the deconcentra-
tion scope, the Chief of Economic and Scientiﬁc Section William Marquat convened a meeting on April 17, 
1948 to review the lists for designated companies under the Deconcentration Law. During the meeting, 
Edward Welsh (New Dealer) of the Anti-Trust and Cartels Division presented a new “List of Designated 
Companies” reducing the total number of companies from 325 to 293. However, Marquat was not satisﬁed 
with the minor changes and stated that nearly 200 companies should be identiﬁed as not excessive concen-
trations of power, and be removed from the lists.114）
 Under these circumstances, Deconcentration Review Board (DRB) arrived in Japan on May 4, 1948. Team 
of ﬁve individuals, hand-picked by Draper, were: Roy S. Campbell, chairman, president, and general 
manager of the New York Shipbuilding Corporation; Joseph B. Robinson, industrial engineer and owner of 
the Robinson Connector Co.; Edward J. Burger, vice-president of the Public Service Co.; Walter R. 
Hutchinson, former Assistant U.S. District Attorney from north Iowa; and Byron D. Woodside, assistant 
director of Corporation Finance, Securities Exchange Commission.115） The members of the board repre-
sented big American companies but ironically, their mission was to examine the inﬂuence of deconcentra-
tion of big Japanese companies. Obviously, the DRB was sympathetic towards the big corporations and 
aimed to reverse what the Deconcentration Law started since their ﬁrst day in Japan. This was the reason 
why William Draper chose these individuals and sent them to Japan.
 In the meantime, the National Foreign Trade Council, representing the largest American corporations, 
sent the heads of General Electric, International Telephone and Telegraph, and Standard Oil to advise 
Draper and Walton Butterworth, head of the Far East division of the State Department, on July 26-27, 
1948. The president of General Electric, which had signiﬁcant investments in the prewar Japanese electrics 
industry, said that American corporations were anxious to reinvest in Japan, but that SCAP’s deconcentra-
tion policy, the purge, and the economic controls created an unfavorable business climate. Under these 
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conditions, the corporations feared for the proﬁtability of their afﬁliates.116） The move by the National 
Foreign Trade Council further fortiﬁed the arguments of the Draper.
 As a result, Draper’s team in Japan started putting a spoke in deconcentration law’s wheel. In July, 
Deconcentration Review Board started examining its ﬁrst case, Nippon Soda, and decided to exclude the 
company from the deconcentration lists. DRB did not settle for small changes in the deconcentration 
process and altered the procedures for deconcentration. After the examination, DRB enunciated “four prin-
ciples” in August to guide the Holding Company Liquidation Commission.117） The principles introduced 
“obstructing procedural points” and complicated the process of determining whether a company was 
excessive economic power or not. However, according to Hadley, DRB had no authority to determine what 
companies were excessive concentrations; it had been invited to Japan to determine the effect of the pro-
posed organization plan of companies.118） Regardless, with the new principles introduced by the board, the 
number of designated companies were gradually decreased.
 In its ﬁnal report to SCAP on July 15, 1949, the Deconcentration Review Board claimed that the decon-
centration of excessive companies was ﬁnished. The report said, out of the originally designated 325 com-
panies, 50 were removed from designation prior to board’s arrival; 38 were removed by board’s recom-
mendation; 179 were removed as a result of application of “four principles”; 2 were closed before decon-
centration; and 37 were classiﬁed as requiring no physical breakup. Therefore, the Board successfully 
designated 19 companies out of 325, to be decentralized. Among 19 companies, 11 (Japan Iron and Steel, 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsui Mining, Mitsubishi Mining, Sumitomo Mining, Oji Paper, Teikoku 
Fiber, Daikin Industries, Toyo Can, Dainippon Beer, and Hokkaido Dairy Coop.) were ordered to be 
divided into smaller corporations while 8 companies were required to dispose/liquidate certain plans and 
securities.119） More than two-thirds of the designated companies were excluded from the deconcentration 
lists by direct involvement of the Deconcentration Review Board. After a year-long effort in Japan, DRB 
managed to lower the number of the companies just under the 6 percent of what was intended in the ﬁrst 
place.
 DRB did not favor radical reforms and wanted to make sure that the industrial structure in Japan remains 
intact. At the end, they succeeded in that. With the moderation of the reform program and drastic cuts in 
reparations, Draper mission achieved great success in the reversal of the economic policies of the 
Occupation. However, the reversal of the course was not ﬁnished yet. It was George Kennan and his report 
“Policy Planning Staff 28” (PPS-28) that completed the reversal of policies. Based on PPS-28, a broad 
framework of U.S. national policy was established and completely changed the U.S. stance towards the 
occupation of Japan. In the next part, the key points of Kennan mission will be touched upon brieﬂy.
C. Kennan Mission and the Entrenchment of Recovery
 George F. Kennan was the foremost authority on the policy toward the Soviet Union. His long telegram 
in 1946, fundamentally changed how the Soviet Union and the threat of communism were perceived in the 
United States. His article “On the Sources of Soviet Conduct” – published in Foreign Affairs journal in 1947 
– provided a realist approach to follow in dealing with the communist nations.120） Kennan was appointed as 
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the head of the Policy Planning Staff that was established by Secretary of State George Marshall in 
1947.121）
 One of the ﬁrst tasks of the Policy Planning Staff was to examine the prospects of an early Peace Treaty 
with Japan. The Early Peace Proposal made by MacArthur during a press conference in March 1947, 
prodded the State Department to make necessary preparations. Taking part in these preparations, Kennan 
was skeptical about the MacArthur’s proposal. Kennan considered Western Germany and Japan as the 
“theaters of greatest dangers, greatest responsibilities, and greatest possibilities” of the United States in 
late 1947. He thought that the two industrial complexes – Germany and Japan –were the centers of 
Europe and East Asia, and their recovery was essential to the restoration of stability in those regions.122） 
Moreover, Japan was the sole great potential military-industrial arsenal of the Far East. Hence, unlike 
China, Japan was a potential factor in world political developments.123） However, Kennan stressed that occu-
pation policies did not reﬂect the realities of recent developments, rather showed “evangelical liberalism, 
punitive enthusiasm, and unreal hopes for great-power collaboration in the postwar period.” These issues 
restricted the potential of Japan and crippled the democratic prospects in the country. Meantime, civil 
unrest and numerous economic problems raised the concerns over the future of Japan. For these reasons, 
Kennan concluded that Japan was neither stable enough nor ready for a peace treaty.
 Yet, Kennan did not conﬁne himself with that conclusion. He decided to pay a visit to Japan to grasp the 
situation better and persuade MacArthur to change the current policies of SCAP. Just before his depar-
ture, he handed out a detailed paper to Secretary of State Marshall. The paper mentioned that U.S. objec-
tive for the coming period should be to “devise policies toward Japan which would assure the security of 
that country from Communist penetration and domination as well as from military attack by the Soviet 
Union,” and “permit Japan’s economic potential to become once again an important force in the affairs of 
the area, conducive to peace and stability.”124） Hence, similar to Draper’s way of thinking, Kennan was con-
structing policies for economic revival even before he arrive in Japan.
 Following these developments, Kennan departed for Japan.125） He was aided by Marshall Green, a Foreign 
Service ofﬁcer who had been private secretary to Ambassador Joseph Grew in Tokyo, during his journey. 
Marshall Green provided invaluable help to Kennan who had no knowledge about Japanese Affairs.126） 
Even though we do not know to what extent Marshall Green inﬂuenced Kennan’s way of thinking, we can 
argue that the Japan Crowd was making a comeback to the political scene after the punitive measures for 
Japan started to lose supporters in early 1948 while the moderate policies gained momentum once more. 
Kennan arrived in Japan on March 1, 1948 and throughout his stay, he met three times with MacArthur to 
discuss the situation in Japan.
 During the ﬁrst meeting, MacArthur performed a two-hour long monolog, telling that Japanese were 
thirsty for both democracy and Christianity. MacArthur continued and said “for the ﬁrst time in their 
history the Japanese were now tasting freedom … Peoples who once learned what freedom and democracy 
meant would never willingly return to slavery.” For that reason, he argued, Japanese would never willingly 
accept Communist domination. In other words, MacArthur claimed that the Japanese communists were no 
menace.127） The ﬁrst meeting proved unproductive and ended without any discussions on occupation policies.
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 Kennan requested a personal meeting with Macarthur to ﬁnd some answers to the questions he had in 
mind. In their second meeting on March 5, Kennan discussed the leading problems of occupation policy 
with MacArthur. MacArthur agreed with the plan of the State Department that the economic recovery 
should be made the primary objective. However, MacArthur was concerned that changes in the occupa-
tion policies, especially on the development of foreign trade, would be criticized by the representatives of 
the Far Eastern Commission. Far Eastern countries were suspicious of economic empowerment of Japan 
because they feared that Japan would establish an economic dominance in the region that is similar to the 
pre-war era. MacArthur mentioned these problems should be solved ﬁrst to get Japan started again as a 
processing and trading nation. As a solution for the economic problems, MacArthur suggested establish-
ing a “revolving fund” which would provide loans for Japan to be used to buy the necessary raw materials 
for her industries.128）
 George Kennan and the MacArthur convened the third meeting on March 21, 1948. Draper, too, joined 
the discussions to represent the views of the Department of the Army. The trio focused on mainly two 
topics: establishment of a small defense force in Japan and the reparation policies. Laying out straight, 
Draper expressed that there was a general trend in Army toward building a small defensive force in Japan 
before the occupation ends. When asked about his opinions, MacArthur said he was unalterably opposed 
to any such plan because: (1) it would contradict with U.S. primary objectives of demilitarization and alien-
ate the Far Eastern nations; (2) it would further retard the economic recovery in Japan; and (3) it would 
contradict with the article 9 of the new constitution. Rebuked by MacArthur, Draper changed the topic to 
reparations. MacArthur said Japan has already paid over ﬁfty billion dollars by virtue of her lost properties 
in outside of her homeland. Together with the destruction that Japan faced, MacArthur believed that Japan 
has suffered enough. According to him, the continuation of the reparations program was just making Japan 
more and more dependent on American taxpayers and foreign aid. He insisted that there was a critical 
need in Japan for every tool, factory, and practically every industrial installation to increase the production 
and balance the Japanese economy. Thus, MacArthur argued that reparations of the industries, which have 
no place in the future Japanese economy, should be completed while the thought of further reparations of 
other industries should be abandoned entirely.129）
 In light of this discussion, George Kennan prepared his famous report PPS-28 on March 25, 1948. First 
and foremost, the report stressed that the United States should not press for a peace treaty at this time. 
Then, it touched upon various topics including U.S forces in Japan, future of Okinawa, strengthening of the 
Japanese police, reform programs, economic recovery, reparations, and war crimes trials. Relevant to our 
topic I should mention three crucial recommendations by Kennan.
 To start with, Kennan favored keeping the Far Eastern Commission intact but recommended that the 
United States should not hesitate to use unilateral directives whenever they failed to obtain prompt action 
in the FEC.130） Probably inﬂuenced by MacArthur’s criticism of Far Eastern Commission, Kennan sup-
ported the unilateral actions to overcome the gridlock over reparations and economic recovery program. In 
other words, Kennan recommended that U.S. should be in charge of the policies –such as reparations and 
economic recovery– that were not settled by the FEC. This approach constituted a distinct demarcation 
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between the implementation of early and late occupation policies. While early occupation policies were 
implemented under a watchful Far Eastern Commission, the latter policies were directly initiated by 
Washington and disregarded the multilateral organizations in the process.
 Kennan report also urged to moderate the purge policies, paving the way for many bureaucrats, business-
men, and public workers to return to the public life. More importantly, the report underpinned that eco-
nomic recovery should be made the prime objective of the U.S. policy in Japan and reparations should be 
done in accordance with the levels proposed by second Strike mission. However, Kennan mentioned that 
both changes should be implemented after consultation with the ﬁndings of Draper mission.131）
 The recommendations of the Kennan mission (PPS-28) later produced the broad framework for U.S. 
policy toward Japan. It became the source that U.S. national policy built upon. The PPS-28 was discussed 
in National Security Council and after two revisions and small adjustments, it was accepted as NSC 13/2 
on October 7. Two days later, President Truman approved it as the new U.S. approach toward Japan. With 
this policy, U.S. aimed to draw a non-punitive peace treaty for Japan and decided to reverse punitive 
reform policies. The document underlined the importance of Japan for the U.S. security and depicted an 
economically strong Japan which trades extensively with her neighbors for her economic recovery.132） 
Curiously, the document was not explicit about the termination of the reparations program. Departments of 
the Army and State both agreed that reparations were a hindrance to the economic recovery and should 
be ceased immediately. But the termination of the program dragged on until May 12, 1949. Only then, 
both departments agreed that the implementation of the reparations was impossible under the FEC deci-
sion. This was followed by a unilateral announcement by U.S. representative to FEC, Frank McCoy. 
McCoy explained that there was little or no prospect of the Far Eastern Commission agreeing on a repara-
tions share schedule. Moreover, McCoy said Japan had already paid substantial reparations through the 
liquidation of her former overseas assets.133） In the light of these, McCoy announced that reparations were 
terminated unilaterally by the United States.
 Following the NSC 13/2, Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a telegram to MacArthur on December 11, 1948. The 
telegram ordered MacArthur to take the necessary actions to implement “Nine-Part Interim Directive on 
Stabilization.” The interim directive ordered implementing an economic stabilization program to achieve 
ﬁscal, monetary, price and wage stability in Japan and to maximize production for export.134） With stabiliza-
tion plan directive, the period of policy development for the economic recovery had ﬁnally ended.135） To 
achieve economic recovery goals, Truman appointed Detroit banker, Joseph Dodge who arrived in Japan 
on February 1, 1949. Dodge took the role of an “economic czar,” and swiftly applied austerity measures to 
curb the inﬂation problem. By April 25, 1949, the single exchange rate (360 yen to a dollar) was established 
and the last obstacle to the economic recovery of Japan was cleared out. The ﬁnancial stabilization program 
of Dodge stopped the inﬂation immediately, but brought some economic setbacks, too. The famous Dodge 
Line created convoluted unemployment problems, reduced the budgets of various government sectors, 
including education, and increased the unrest within the Labor unions. Moreover, it could not increase the 
production output of the industries and failed to create an impetus for economic recovery. On the contrary, 
numerous scholars argued that Dodge Line introduced deﬂation rather than stabilization to Japan.
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V Conclusion
 The liberal reform policies that started in early 1946, were weakened by the numerous economic problems 
in Japan. Unhappy with the situation in Japan, domestic pressure groups within the United States started 
criticizing occupation policies and requested their reversal. The domestic pressures – combined with dis-
senters of the occupation programs in Washington– beaconed an intervention by Washington in late 1947. 
This process gave birth to the dispatch of two high-ranking ofﬁcers, namely William Draper and George 
Kennan, of the Departments of the Army and State. Consecutively, Draper and Kennan missions recom-
mended unilateral U.S. action to stop the reparations and deconcentration program in spring of 1948. The 
reversal of the punitive measures and the entrenchment of the economic recovery were molded into their 
ofﬁcial shape in October 1948 with the adoption of NSC 13/2. As a result of the new U.S. foreign policy 
toward Japan, U.S. publicly announced in May 1949 that reparations were terminated; while two months 
later, the hand-picked team of Draper –Deconcentration Review Board– announced that deconcentration of 
excessive economic power was successfully completed.
 The above-mentioned order of events explains the process that resulted in the implementation of economic 
recovery in the occupation period. However, it does not offer or provide concrete answers to the questions 
that we have previously enquired. Here, let us go back to the questions that were laid out in the introduc-
tion part and answer them accordingly.
 How did the punitive measures for occupation occur? The policy formulation for the occupation started in 
late 1942 within the Department of State. Until the last phase of the Paciﬁc War, moderate policies –under 
the inﬂuence of the Japan Crowd– dominated the policy formulating committees. However, after the death 
of Roosevelt, Harry Truman became the president and the endorsers of “soft peace” were replaced by the 
China Crowd. In the meantime, Washington sent the “Initial Policy” (JCS 1380/15) to SCAP which envi-
sioned stern and punitive principles related to the operation of Japanese economic system. New Dealers 
within the GHQ regarded Initial Policy as the “bible of the occupation.” Accordingly, they started formulat-
ing and implementing comprehensive liberal reform policies without paying much attention to the eco-
nomic situation in Japan. In the light of these, the punitive measures gained support and eventually were 
implemented in the ﬁrst phase of the occupation.
 To what extent, the economic distress in Japan affected the policy formulation in Washington? At the end of 
World War II, Japan was torn apart; her factories were lying in ruins while her people were surviving 
barely with the Government Reliefs by the United States. Although the occupation authorities accom-
plished much success in a short-span of time, Japanese economy did not show any indication of recovery. 
GNP in 1947 was just slightly over half of the 1937 level; exports and imports plummeted to abysmal levels 
and the inﬂation went out of control. These problems resulted in civil unrest that strengthened the right 
and left wing extremists and endangered the nurture of democratic values in Japan.
 Starting from February 1946, many American ofﬁcials in Washington and Tokyo argued that to safeguard 
the American type of democracy in Japan, economic recovery was a must-do. Based on these arguments, 
State and Army Departments prepared policies for making Japan self-supporting and agreed to make eco-
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nomic recovery the top priority of U.S. occupation policy by October 9, 1947. Therefore, the economic 
distress in Japan enormously affected the policy formulation in Washington. Without economic problems, 
Washington might not have started the policy formulation for economic recovery and achieve a consensus 
on policy changes in such an early phase. Without economic problems in Japan, the formulation of the 
recovery plans might have been delayed until the “loss of China,” and or even Korean War where the Cold 
War between the capitalists and socialists became apparent more than ever.
 Were there any pressures to Washington by American pressure groups/businessmen to revive Japanese economy? 
If so, did they utilize the threat of communism in Japan to justify their purposes? Short answers to these 
questions are: “yes” and “probably, yes.” In retrospect, the role of the American pressure groups on policy 
reversal is not studied by many. However, based on the arguments of Howard Schonberger –the leading 
scholar on the topic–, we see that “Japan Lobby” played a crucial role in the reversal of policies by 
enabling printed media. The Newsweek magazine, its foreign editor Harry Kern, and the contributors of the 
articles – Packenham and Kauffman – stood against the punitive measures and favored a moderated 
approach that encourages the economic recovery of Japan. They acquired top-secret policy documents and 
leaked their contents; and stressed the burden of the occupation on American taxpayers to catch 
Washington’s attention. By doing so, they even inﬂuenced the Eightieth Congress which was very skepti-
cal of increasing the foreign aid to Europe and Japan. Standing on the congress ﬂoor, Senator William 
Knowland attacked the deconcentration policies twice and accused FEC-230 and the Deconcentration Bill 
for going beyond the original goals and being “socialistic.”
 Both Japan Lobby and Senator Knowland employed a jargon that was heavily inﬂuenced by the Cold War 
dynamics. In every opportunity, they claimed that Japan was becoming more and more “socialist” and did 
not shy away from using forged evidence to fortify this approach. However, the crux of the problem 
remains disputed. There is some evidence that Japan Lobby used false information and aggravated the 
facts. Kern’s estimates of the number of people affected by economic purge; Kauffman’s estimations about 
a serious drop in industrial output as a result of purge policies; the argument that underpin the burdens of 
the occupation on American taxpayers; the claims of Kauffman and Knowland that anti-American capitalist 
system was under construction in Japan were all debunked by scholars and ofﬁcials of the occupation such 
as Kazuo Kawai, Theodore Cohen, Eleanor Hadley and Charles Kades. They out that members of the 
Japan Lobby had vested interests in Japan, thus they wanted to stop the deconcentration and reparations 
policies. For this reason, we can argue that the dissenters of the occupation policies utilized the threat of 
communism in Japan to justify their purposes. However, the evidence mentioned above is not exhaustive, 
therefore should be taken with a grain of salt until further evidence becomes apparent.
 This brings us to the last question: Did American ex-businessmen/bureaucrats play a role in reversing the 
course? Without any doubt, they played a great role in reversing the course. Many ex-businessmen and 
high ranking ofﬁcials in Washington yearned for a strong Japanese economy. Founder of the Newsweek 
magazine and the Secretary of Commerce Averell Harriman; cotton producer/lobbyist and Republican 
Senator William Knowland; the president of Dillion & Read, Co. and the Secretary of Defense James F. 
Forrestal; the vice-president of Dillion & Read, Co. and the Under Secretary of the Army William Draper 
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were the vocal supporters. They thought that the liberal reform policies under the inﬂuence of New 
Dealers were crippling the business opportunities in Japan. That was why Draper went to Japan and 
brought a group of prominent businessmen with him to buttress his own recommendations to the 
President, the Secretary of State, and the Congress. He pushed for limiting the reparations and ending the 
deconcentration program, a process in which he emerged victorious. Arguably, Draper played the most 
important role in the reversal of occupation policies.
 The other bureaucrat who played a central role was George Kennan of the Policy Planning Staff in the 
State Department. Kennan was not an ex-businessman and had a different reasoning for policy changes. 
He approached the problem in Japan from a geostrategic viewpoint and argued that Japan was too valuable 
for the U.S. national security. Therefore he thought Japan should not fall to communism. To prevent such 
a calamity, he agreed with Draper’s proposal of strengthening Japanese economy. His report, Policy 
Planning Staff – 28, became the milestone in the U.S. foreign policy toward Japan. In October 1948, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff adopted NSC 13/2 – a revised version of the Kennan’s paper – and the formulation for the 
reversal of policies have ended.
 In light of these developments, this paper concludes that economic distress in Japan and the American 
pressure groups ignited the debates over the occupation policies and created the impetus for a reversal of 
the policies. They eventually triggered an intervention by Washington which unilaterally changed or 
stopped the ongoing reform programs. In other words, the intensiﬁcation of the Cold War solely did not 
cause the “reverse course.” Rather the Cold War dynamics fortiﬁed the already existent arguments of the 
policy-makers and the American businessmen who desired the economic recovery. Therefore, the inﬂu-
ence and the importance of these two factors should not be dwarfed and underestimated by the macro-
level explanations of policy reversals.
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